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EXPROPRIATION
Melvin G. Dakin*
AUTHORITY TO TAKE AND NATURE OF THE INTEREST TAKEN
The inequities of appropriations for levee construction remain
without remedy. While the legislature made a beginning in 1978 by
providing for the payment of fair market value rather than merely
payment of assessed value for such takings, the mandate was made
contingent on funds being appropriated for such purpose at the federal,
state, or local level.' Appropriations have not been forthcoming. The
1978 legislation was made applicable to claims pending on July 10,
1978, thus blanketing in for possible relief claims for appropriations
already made by levee districts in concert with the United States
Corps of Engineers.2 In 1979, the legislature had second thoughts and
repealed the retroactive application of potential reimbursement at fair
market value.' In Terrebonne v. South Louisiana Tidal Water Control
Levee District,' a court of appeals reached the interesting conclusion
that while Act 314 of 1978 established substantive rights, retroactive
extension of the legislation to claimants with suits pending on July
10, 1978, was merely "a procedural device concerned with application
of the act itself, rather than the substantive rights granted therein."5
Act 676 of 1979 deleting this "procedural device" was hence merely
"interpretive legislation" which did not disturb vested rights.' This
tour deforce seems to say that one of the groups most clearly deprived,
namely those against whom exercise of the servitude via appropriation
was already in effect, have nonetheless been only procedurally affected
and have lost nothing because they had nothing. A more propitious
solution seemed ready at hand in the 1978 provision that market value
would be paid only when and to the extent that funds were ap-
propriated; arguably, no right to receive market value could be deemed
vested until the funds were appropriated. Until then, just compensa-
tion was only a hope since the servitude was deemed in existence
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1. 1978 La. Acts, No. 314.
2. Id.
3. 1979 La. Acts, No. 676, amending LA. R.S. 38:281(B)(1) (1950).
4. 414 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
5. Id. at 815.
6. Id. at 816.
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from the time the riparian property was separated from the public
domain, and exercise of the servitude, with payment of only assessed
value, was held constitutional as not a taking; the payment has been
characterized as a gratuity7 rather than an attempted payment of just
compensation.
During a period of subdivision flooding due to heavy rains, a police
jury entered the premises of an adjoining agricultural landowner and
blocked newly opened ditches from the farmlands so as to permit sub-,
sidence of flood waters in the subdivision. The action was taken to
maintain "the efficiency of the drainage channels."8 When the ditches
were reopened by the landowner, the police jury sought injunctive
relief and the landowner countered with the claim that enjoining him
would constitute a taking of his property. The trial court, affirmed
by the court of appeal,9 nevertheless granted injunctive relief on the
ground that the statute authorizing a servitude to the police jury sus-
tained such relief where necessary for the preservation of the effi-
ciency of a public drainage channel. The Louisiana Supreme Court,
in Terrebonne Parish Police Jury v. Matherne, ° found the statutory
interpretation partially correct but too sweeping in its interpretation
of powers granted to the local government thereunder. Mindful,
perhaps, of the threat of the "petty larceny of the police power"'1
impinging upon the citizen's right to own, use, and enjoy private pro-
perty, the court refused to sustain the injunction under the public
drainage statute. Nonetheless, it was sustained on the ground that,
under the Civil Code articles concerning public drain, 2 the agricultural
landowner, as the dominant estate, was violating the rights, of the
subservient estates in opening ditches which concentrated the flow
of water onto such estates in a more burdensome manner than was
contemplated under the servitude of public drain. No property right
was taken by the injunction since the landowner was merely being
prevented from doing what he had no right to do. 3
In City of Lafayette v. Delhomme Funeral Home," the city had
made a determination that certain property was necessary in order
to add a left turn lane and negotiations having failed, brought an ac-
tion to expropriate the property. On appeal from a judgment in favor
7. Pillow v. Board of Commissioners, 369 So. 2d 1172, 1177 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1979).
8. LA. R.S. 38:113 (1950).
9. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury v. Matherne, 394 So. 2d 1302 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1981).
10. 405 So. 2d 314 (La. 1981).
11. 1 HOLMES - LASKI LETTERS 457 (M. Howe ed. 1953).
12. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 655-656.
13. 405 So. 2d at 318-19.
14. 413 So. 2d 348 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
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of the city, the property owner argued that the city had not carried
its burden of proving the expropriation to be necessary for the public
interest. The contention was quickly disposed of under a statute grant-
ing authority to the city to expropriate "whenever such a course is
determined to be necessary for the public interest"; 15 the court held
judicial review was precluded except as to constitutional issues. The
contention was also made that the city had acted unreasonably in select-
ing the property for expropriation and had abused its discretion, acted
in bad faith, and acted arbitrarily. The record indicated, however, that
the city had acted on the basis of adequate engineering and economic
data, and hence the finding of the trial court was not clearly wrong. 6
In Hernandez v. City of Lafayette," the city engaged in a more
sophisticated kind of taking, due to disagreement between the city
council and the mayor. In Hernandez, the property owner was admit-
tedly entitled to rezoning of his tract as a result of public and private
developments in the area; rezoning had been deferred, however, in
light of a city ordinance providing for realignment of a major street
so as to bisect the landowner's property. As one councilman stated,
"[i]f we change zoning to another classification, we are going to have
to pay more money when we create the right-of-way."18 The owner
filed suit in state court seeking a mandatory injunction to compel the
city .to change the zoning classification on his property. When the coun-
cil voted to rezone, the mayor vetoed the rezoning. Thereafter, a set-
tlement was negotiated by the council and an appropriate ordinance
passed; the agreement and zoning were again vetoed by the mayor.
The council then repealed the ordinance declaring the realignment
and expropriation a "public necessity."' 9 In this posture of the case,
the plaintiff brought a federal civil rights action" alleging that the
city had delayed its decision on rezoning in order to maintain a lower
market value for the land which it proposed to expropriate. The
federal trial court held the council and the mayor legislatively im-
mune from such a suit, and the city was deemed immune because
the damages or deprivation resulted from the city's failure to act
promptly rather than from affirmative action of any kind; on appeal, the
trial court was upheld as to legislative immunity for the council and
the mayor, but not as to the city.2 The appeals court agreed with
the owner's contention that the refusal of the city to change his pre-
15. LA. R.S. 19:102 (Supp. 1977).
16. 413 So. 2d at 351.
17. 643 F.2d 1188 (5th Cir. 1981).
18. Id. at 1190.
19. Id. at 1191.
20. 42 U.S.C. S 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
21. 643 F.2d at 1198-99.
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sent zoning classification denied him any reasonable economically
viable use of his property." In these circumstances, the court, noting
that the legislative history of the fourteenth amendment indicated that
it had been passed with the overruling of Barron v. Mayor of
Baltimore"3 in mind, found that the Civil Rights Act properly could
be used to redress a taking of private property by a state for a public
use without compensation. Citing Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
New York City" for the proposition that property may be taken by
police power regulation such as zoning ordinances and other land use
regulations, the court reversed summary judgment for the city and
remanded the case to the trial court to enable the owner to pursue
his claim for damages "in an amount equal to just compensation for
the value of the property during the period of the 'taking.'"25
In Parish of Jefferson v. Marsh Investment Corp.,"6 the parish
sought the expropriation in fee of a tract of land previously rented
for sewage disposal purposes. The trial court granted only a partial
servitude on the grounds that insufficient efforts had been made to
purchase the property and the purchase of other property made ex-
propriation of the instant property unnecessary. The court of appeals
reversed and granted expropriation of the fee, noting that further
negotiations would have been vain and useless;' the court noted also
that the expropriating authorities had sound discretion to determine
the necessity of an expropriation, and in the circumstances here, a
parish plan to utilize already fouled property to avoid further en-
vironmental problems was not a bad faith exercise of the expropriating
agency's discretion. 8
In K. G. Farms, Inc. v. State," the landowner sought to reduce
an unused taking in fee for highway purposes to a taking of a ser-
22. Id.
23. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (the court denied the use of the fifth amendment
to an owner in a suit against a state).
24. 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978).
25. 643 F.2d at 1200. In United States v. City of Pittsburg, California, 661 F.2d
783 (9th Cir. 1981), the city sought to counter a federal regulation permitting postal
carriers to take shortcuts across residential lawns by enacting a trespass ordinance.
The United States challenged the ordinance on preemption grounds; the city counter-
ing that the ordinance merely prevented the taking of private property without just
compensation. The court held that the city had no standing to raise the fifth amend-
ment issue, and that even if it had such standing, the federal regulation taking was
miniscule and did not significantly dilute or affect property rights or interests, but
left property owners in full control of their property; the court held there was no taking.
26. 398 So. 2d 27 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
27. Id. at 28.
28. Id.
29. 402 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
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vitude as to the shoulder of the proposed road." The trial court was
reversed in granting the reduction; a court of appeals, citing State
v. Olinkraft, 1 found that in taking full ownership, the state's action
was not arbitrary, capricious, or in bad faith, but based on sound
engineering considerations.
DAMAGES AND VALUATION
Willful and wanton damage in disregard of the rights of a proper-
ty owner, as was present in Daniel v. Department of Transportation
and Development, 2 again has been found to free a trial court to adopt
a damage approach which will do substantial justice. In Pearce v.
E. J. Earnest, Inc.," a contractor for the state entered premises with
no color of authority and, with notice of the probable invalidity of
the action, did substantial damage to the premises, including destruc-
tion of numerous ornamental trees. The state argued that the owner
was estopped to claim damages since he had failed to minimize such
damages by seeking injunctive relief. However, in light of a clear pro-
test by the owner and reasonably timely resort to legal action, the
court found no failure to act nor acquiescence in the appropriation
of property involved.,' The court noted that, while generally the so-
called "before and after rule" would be applicable to the calculation
of damages, the trial court had discretion in the case of willful damage
to determine the "aesthetic value" of individual trees in order that
substantial justice might be done in the case. 5 It was also held that
the state alone was liable for damages awarded to the property owner
in light of the state's failure to obtain the right of way from the prop-
erty owners resulting in the subsequent trespass and damages inci-
dent thereto.3"
In State v. Bitterwolf,' the Louisiana Supreme Court was presented
with a res nova issue respecting the extent of setoff for changes in
value caused by a proposed improvement for which property was
taken. A statute, which became effective in 1975, implemented
legislatively the new constitutional requirement that "the owner shall
be compensated to the full extent of his loss."8 The statute also car-
30. Presumably, the reduction to servitude status was sought in order to take
advantage of Civil Code article 753, providing a ten year prescription on predial
servitudes.
31. 350 So. 2d 865 (La. 1977).
32. 396 So. 2d 967 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
33. 411 So. 2d 1276 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
34. Id. at 1279.
35. Id. at 1280.
36. Id. at 1280-81.
37. 415 So. 2d 196 (La. 1982).
38. LA. R.S. 48:453(C) (Supp. 1974) (implementing LA. CONST. art. I, 5 4).
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ried forward the principle that, with respect to the award of compen-
sation for property, such award is to be made "without considering
any change in value caused by the proposed improvement for which
the property is taken," and legislatively restated the "before and after
rule" with respect to damages to remainders and its proviso that the
measure of damages is to be applied "taking into consideration the
effects of the completion of the project in the manner proposed or
planned. '39 In Bitterwolf, the trial court had awarded in compensation
and severance damages an amount exceeding the price paid by the
purchaser for the entire premises, such excess being at least in part
attributable to expropriation-caused depreciation subsequent to the
announcement of the project but prior to the purchase of the proper-
ty by the owner.4 0 It was argued by the owner that he was entitled
to an upward adjustment of market value as of the time of taking
since the depreciation in value had been induced by the announce-
ment of the project; the argument was rejected "[iln view of the
legislative aim to compensate each owner to the full extent of his
loss," the court's inference being that "the statute implicitly applies
only to changes in value which occur during an expropriatee's owner-
ship of the property." 1 Thus, all of the expropriation-induced deprecia-
tion in value which occurred before the owner purchased the proper-
ty was to be reflected in the market value measuring the compensa-
tion for the taking and damage to the remainder. 42 The court noted,
however, that the record was ambiguous on whether "the depressive
effect on market value attributable to the project's announcement had
fully run its course before [the owner] acquired the property," and
in the interest of justice, the case was remanded for trial and deter-
mination of this issue as well as the proper amount of the award and
severance damages in light of the views expressed by the court. 3
In State v. Landeche,"' an appeals court had occasion to note again
that severance damages cannot be presumed and that an expert opin-
39. Id. S 453 (A), (B). These provisions were not included in amendments to the
general appropriation statute (LA. R.S. 19:9 (1950 & Supp. 1974)), nor to the statute gov-
erning expropriations by municipal corporations. LA. R.S. 19:110 (Supp. 1977)). The
statutes contain only the language of Civil Code article 2633, augmented by the 1974
constitutional provision that "the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of
his loss." Presumably, the same result will be reached in cases involving these statutes
where there is a change in ownership after a project's announcement. In the most
recent case involving a taking by a municipal corporation there was no interim sale
and the issue did not arise. Town of Rayville v. Thomason, 404 So. 2d 1290 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1981).
40. 415 So. 2d at 198-99.
41. Id. at 202.
42. Id. at 203.
43. Id. at 204.
44. 400 So. 2d 241 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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ion, without any evidence on which such opinion could be based, could
not be used to establish severance damages. In this instance, the ex-
pert indicated that he "did not really put a dollar value on it," but
merely considered various inconveniences stemming from the ex-
propriation. Nonetheless, the trial court used the opinion to award
damages of some $178,000; no significance was attributed by the court
to other expert opinion that special benefits would result to the owners
in the amount of some $120,000.", In light of these facts, the court
of appeals reversed the holding on the ground that the owner did
not carry the burden of proving severance damages with legal cer-
tainty and by a preponderance of the evidence." There being no
evidence of lease advantage in favor of the lessee, only estimated
damages [to the lessee] resulting from increased costs were awarded. 7
In State v. Davis," a trial court was affirmed in awarding "lease
termination damage" to assure that the owner received compensation
"to the full extent of his loss." 9 Damages were deemed appropriate
inasmuch as a building was in the process of construction on the
land taken and was under a lease permitting the lessee to purchase
the building and land at the end of one year's rental, at cost plus
15 percent. The trial court accepted a calculation consisting of the
cost of construction up to the time of taking plus land, as a percen-
tage of the completed cost of construction plus land, such percentage
to be applied to one year's rent; in accordance with the lease, 15 per-
cent of the partially completed project cost was to be added to this
amount to arrive at total termination damage allowance. 5' This damage
allowance was in addition to an award for the market value of the
land taken and for the unrecovered construction expenditures of the
owner-lessor. 1
In City of Baton Rouge v. Tullier,52 the city was denied the nor-
mal benefits of a long-term lease purchase on the ground that it con-
stituted a "windfall." The circumstances were somewhat unique in that
45. Id. at 244-45.
46. Id. at 247.
47. Id. at 248.
48. 400 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
49. Id. at 927.
50. Id. at 928-29.
51. Some duplication in the total award might seem present if the cost of the
building is viewed as the present value of future rentals for the life of the building
under the residual method. See M. DAKIN & M. KLEIN, EMINENT DOMAIN IN LOUISIANA
213 (1970). The possible duplication would consist in the award of one year's rent as
part of the termination damages while also awarding the presumed present value of
future rentals for the entire life of the partially completed building in the guise of
construction expenditures.
52. 401 So. 2d 422 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied 406 So. 2d 605 (La. 1981).
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the city was both lessee and expropriator and the premises had been
converted to a "special purpose." The provisions in the commercial
lease for protection of the parties in the event of expropriation also
suffered from vagueness; while title to lessee improvements inured
to the lessor at the voluntary termination of the lease, in the event
of termination by expropriation, the lease provided for "such division
of the proceeds and awards ... as shall be just and equitable under
the circumstances," and provided further that "deprivation of the Te-
nant of the use of such improvements shall, pro tanto, be an item of
damage in determining the amount of condemnation award to which
the Tenant is entitled."" In the absence of specific guidance in the
lease, the normal appraisal procedure in case of termination by ex-
propriation was accepted by the trial court and the lessor was allot-
ted the reversionary interest in the improvements, assuming all
renewal options were exercised; the lessee was allotted the present
value of the use of the improvements for the maximum lease period."
A court of appeals was somehow persuaded that this could result in
a "windfall" to the city; it rejected the appraiser's calculations and
awarded the city only its construction cost, thus imposing on the city
the risks which were the lessor's under the long-term contract. While
the interest rate used might be questioned, the approach of the trial
court seemed unassailable; rejecting it rather than modifying it could
only result in a "windfall" to the lessor!"
In general, in takings by the state under the highway "quick-taking
statute," the measure of compensation is the market value of the pro-
perty as of the date the estimated compensation was deposited in
the registry of the court.' In State v. Boudreaux,5 however, it was
noted that the statutory designation of the recipient of the deposit
53. 401 So. 2d at 425 (emphasis in the original).
54. Id. at 424-25.
55. Failure to understand the trial court's approach is evidenced by the inter-
pretation given in the opinion. The first circuit stated, "Using this method, the trial court
applied a 9% discount rate and figured the present value of the right to receive
$4,623,000 in 77 years is $4,623,000 multiplied by the inward co-efficient [Inwood coeffi-
cient/factor of .0013 which equals $4,616,990.10." (sic] 401 So. 2d at 425 (emphasis add-
ed). This calculation yields $6,010, which is the present value of the reversionary in-
terest of the lessor at 9% discounted 77 years and what he should receive on these
assumptions. The present value of the city's right to'use improvements valued at
$4,623,000 for 77 years at 9% is $4,616,990 and what it should have received as a
credit. The committment to return the improvements in "a good state of repair"- is
reflected in the appraiser's assumption of a fair market value of $4,623,000 at the
time of reversion 77 years hence, but with such market value discounted to present
value. An adjustment might have been made in the discount rate if unfairness was
thought to result, as was suggested by a concurring judge.
56. LA. R.S. 48:453(A) (Supp. 1974).
57. 401 So. 2d 428 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
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must be strictly complied with in order to accomplish vesting of title
and a taking setting the valuation date. Thus, where the person named
in the petition was not the record owner, he was not the "person
entitled thereto," and such a deposit was deemed to have no legal
efficacy. The state argued that since the deposit in this case was made
"for the use and benefit of the persons entitled thereto," there was
substantial compliance with the statute. It was held, however, that
the title would vest in the department only upon the making of the
deposit for the benefit of the very person entitled thereto; hence tak-
ing occurred only after the state had amended its petition designating
therein the names of the true owners entitled to the deposit.9
In Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Poland,9 a court of appeals re-
jected an attempt to litigate, in an expropriation proceeding to take
property for underground gas storage, the validity of a conservation
commissioner's order, an issue properly raised only with the conser-
vation commissioner.' The trial court was affirmed in holding public
purpose and necessity was established by evidence that peak demands
could not always be met by normal production and had to be
augmented by gas stored in a reservoir such as that sought to be
expropriated.' In establishing the market value for an award of just
compensation, the property owners argued that storage rights should
be valued by determining the cost to replace unrecoverable cushion
gas in the reservoir, an approach rejected in Mid-Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Sanchez;" comparable sales of similar storage areas made between
knowledgeable parties were deemed admissible measures of values
under the circumstances."5 The requisite of comparability eliminated,
as evidence of market value, the sale of a salt dome with many more
times B.T.U. storage capacity than the porous-rock reservoir sought
to be expropriated." Attorney's fees amounting to more than the ex-
cess of awards over offers were deemed an abuse of discretion and
reduced to a level more in keeping, by analogy, with the limits pro-
vided in the quick-taking statute."
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
In keeping with general practice regulating the creation of sub-
divisions, Louisiana has made dedication of subdivision streets man-
58. Id. at 431.
59. 406 So. 2d 657 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
60. Id. at 661.
61. Id. at 662.
62. 280 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
63. 406 So. 2d at 664-65.
64. Id. at 665.
65. LA. R.S. 48:453(E) (Supp. 1974); cf. Trunkline Gas Co. v. Rawls, 394 So. 2d 1250
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
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datory and has authorized police juries to prescribe the dimensions
thereof.6 The trial court in Boagni v. State67 permitted a police jury
to reject dedication of a street duly platted and recorded if the street
failed to comply with the prescribed dimensions;68 perhaps hoping for
such an outcome, the subdivider had platted a non-complying street
next to the right of way of a proposed interstate highway. In keep-
ing with interstate construction, the adjacent street was to be con-
verted into a service road. As the state did not expropriate it, the
subdivider brought a successful action in inverse condemnation to
recover the value of the property. The court of appeals was not recep-
tive to this outcome, for the ingenious concatenation of circumstances
left the subdivider with title to a street platted and recorded as a
dedicated street. While the police jury's authority to regulate was
not disputed, dedication was deemed mandatory and could not be
disclaimed even though in partial noncompliance with jury regulation;
therefore, no compensation should have been awarded. 9
A landowner, in State v. Burnett,0 sought severance damages for
loss of access to his remainder land after a portion had been taken
for a "controlled access facility" to an interstate highway to be con-
structed by the state. Both the petition of the state and its order
of expropriation were ambiguous and subject to an interpretation that
the land taken was as an "appurtenance" of a controlled access facili-
ty and hence supported the landowner's claim that he had suffered
loss of access for his remainding land.71 However, a plat of the pro-
posed improvement, as a part of the state's pleading, enabled it to
establish that controlled access ended short of the remainder and hence
did not deny access."2
The 1974 constitutional provision that a landowner "shall be com-
pensated to the full extent of his loss"73 was given a troubling inter-
pretation in City of Lafayette v. Delhomme.74 The city offered $175,000
cash for land which was the site of a grocery store operation, with
the owner to retain ownership of movables consisting of stock and
fixtures and the city to pay moving costs; upon rejection, the city
moved to expropriate. Ostensibly guided by the new constitutional
66. LA. R.S. 33:5051 (1950 & Supp. 1962).
67. 399 So. 2d 813 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
68. Id. at 816.
69. Id. at 817.
70. 411 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982).
71. Id. at 535.
72. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 853 provides: "A copy of any written instrument which is
an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes."
73. LA. CONST. art. I, S 4.
74. 401 So. 2d 1044 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
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provision, the trial court awarded $178,000 for the land and ordered
the city to pay certain business losses, including the cost of moving
and the value of the movables.5 Probably for policy reasons, the city
did not appeal this award although it obviously more than compen-
sated the owner for his loss, particularly if deterioration of stock were
also included in the item "business losses." Without an appeal, the
reviewing court was helpless to modify the award; it could, however,
affirm the trial court's otherwise unsupported refusal to award at-
torney's fees as not an abuse of discretion where the pecuniary award
included payment for movables and a gift of them back to the owner."6
In these circumstances, the city's cash offer for the land, coupled with
the other values stipulated as offered by the city, was deemed to ap-
proximate the award; the owner, by refusal of such offer, had
precipitated unnecessary litigation, the cost of which he should bear.
The court was thus able to avoid, at least respecting attorney's fees,
the consequences of what it viewed as a possibly erroneous constitu-
tional interpretation."
Legal costs of expropriation proceedings have been held to come
within the constitutional guarantee of just and adequate compensa-
tion; a statute departing therefrom by charging costs of unnecessary
litigation to the owner hence must be strictly construed." In Loui-
siana Resources Co. v. Greene,"9 an offer of the value of the land taken,
without taking into account other items making up the total award
to a landowner, was not a tender which should have rendered litiga-
tion unnecessary;" as a consequence, costs were properly assessed
against the expropriator.'
Television companies made another modest advance toward public
utility status, with power to expropriate property essential to their
operations, in Sanders v. Plaquemines Cable TV, Inc.8" The appeals
court assumed arguendo that such companies possess the right to ex-
propriate servitudes providing they strictly comply with enabling
statutes. Thus, a television company was assumed to be within a
statute granting power to expropriate to corporations formed for the
purpose of transmitting intelligence by telegraph, or telephone, or
75. Id. at 1046.
76. Id. at 1046-47.
77. Id. at 1046 n.1.
78. LA. R.S. 19:12 (1950) provides: "If a tender is made of the true value of the prop-
erty to the owner thereof, before proceeding to a forced expropriation, the costs of
the expropriation proceedings shall be paid by the owner."
79. 406 So. 2d 1360 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 1371-72.
81. Id. at 1372.
82. 407 So. 2d 524 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
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other systems of transmitting intelligence.3 However, the company had
failed to negotiate a servitude for the passage of a guy wire with
the current owner of the property, and, since title to the property
had changed hands before the encroachment, acquiesence by the old
owner was of no avail.' With neither good faith negotiations nor ac-
quiesence by the current owner, the company could not bring itself
within the statute continuing the St. Julien doctrine, which recog-
nized good faith appropriation with a corollary right in the owner to
recover just compensation in inverse condemnation.85 The company
was thus unable to avoid an order against it to remove the en-
croachments and was left without judicial protection in the determina-
tion of just compensation unless a new suit for expropriation was
brought."
In Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Sutton,87 the trial court was held
in error in making an award in excess of the market value of
underground gas-storage property, as established by expert opinion;
sales of property presented by the landowner were not comparable
merely by virtue of being abutting or adjacent property if not com-
parable as to subsurface structures. Since there were thus no conflic-
ting admissible comparables to serve as estimates of value, the trial
court was in manifest error in departing from expert testimony in
making its award.8
In Wilson v. State, 9 further inroads were made on the holding
in State v. Guidry," precluding review of the issue of necessity of
a taking for highway purposes. In State v. Jeanerette Lumber & Shingle
Co.,9 the Louisiana Supreme Court held the issue of whether proper-
ty was taken for a highway purpose, as distinguished from merely
a public purpose, was properly raised by a timely motion to dismiss.
In Wilson, the court of appeal held that the issue of necessity could
be raised in a suit to recover land expropriated, but unused, for
highway purposes and that the expropriatee could not be constitu-
tionally precluded therefrom by the ten day limitation on raising the
issue of public purposes;92 the necessity for the extent of the taking
83. LA. R.S. 45:781 (1950).
84. 407 So. 2d at 527.
85. LA. R.S. 19:14 (Supp. 1976).
86. A similar result was reached in Robco, Inc. v. Consolidated Sewerage District,
400 So. 2d 313 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981).
87. 406 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1981).
88. Id. at 672-73.
89. 400 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied 406 So. 2d 608 (La. 1981).
90. 240 So. 2d 516 (La. 1960).
91. 350 So. 2d 847 (La. 1977).
92. 400 So. 2d at 744.
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was deemed not included in the statutory language of "public
purpose." 3
93. The state was also held not precluded by LA. R.S. 48:221 (Supp. 1977 & 1980)
from resale, at cost, of property expropriated in excess of need; the statute, providing
for re~ale of "excess area" at cost or current market value, whichever is greater, was
held not to apply to excess areas not acquired legally. If "legally" excludes "excess-
expropriation," the statute is reduced to coverage of acquisitions by private sale or
donations, although "acquisitions" is not so limited in the statute.

